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I. INTRODUCTION
In Printz v. United States,1 Justice Scalia, writing for the court, called

*
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1. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding unconstitutional the
"Brady Act's" interim provisions directing local law enforcement to conduct required
background checks on purchasers of handguns as inconsistent with principles of U.S.
federalism).
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the use of foreign experiences "inappropriate" to the interpretation of a
constitution.2 Only one day earlier, however, in Washington v. Glucksberg, 3
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,4 made extensive use of
foreign experience to inform the Court's consideration of the constitutionality
of Washington's statutory ban on assisted suicide. 5 One case explicitly
condemns the use of foreign experiences, or comparative analysis, while
the other explicitly invokes their use. 6 In interpretation of the Constitution,
examples of foreign experiences appear in both Supreme and lower court
decisions, but the justification for their use remains unclear. 7
Dissenting in Stanford v. Kentucky, 8 Justice Brennan claims that a
string of case law recognizes the legitimacy of the use of forei~
legislation as an "indicator[] of contemporary standards of decency." 9
2. Id. at 921 n.11.
3. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735-26 (1997) (upholding the
constitutionality of a Washington statute making it a felony to cause one to commit or
assist another in committing suicide).
4. Note that Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion in Glucksberg. Id. at 704.
5. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 734-35.
6. Note that the cases could be distinguished in that Printz addressed issues of
federalism, while Glucksberg addressed issues of due process. Scalia, however, at least
in his writings, has been consistent in his condemnation of the practice, and has
expressed the same sentiment in regard to issues of due process. See Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4 (1988).
7. Several articles have endorsed, at least to a limited degree, the use of
comparative analysis in constitutional interpretation. See generally Sujit Chaudhry,
Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative
Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819 (1999); Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent
Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening Up the Conversation on
"Proportionality," Rights and Federalism, l U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583 (1999); Mark
Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225
(1999). These articles focus on the various ways in which a court might use foreign
experiences in the resolution of domestic issues. What these authors attempt to show is
how courts actually fit these methods of comparison into the larger framework of
constitutional interpretation, and how some justification may be derived from the manner
of use with regard to the courts interpretive methodology. Numerous authors have
recognized the possible role of comparative analysis in constitutional adjudication. See,
e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REv. 771, 772-73
(1997); J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV.
L. REv. 963, 1005 (1998); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a
Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 371-73 (1997).
8. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
9. Id. at 389. In the majority opinion, Scalia rejects the practice. Id. at 369 n.l.
Each in the line of cases includes reference to foreign experiences. See Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988) (citing numerous examples of nations where
juvenile executions are prohibited); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982)
(noting the absence, severe limitation, or abolishment of the doctrine of felony murder in
continental Europe, England, Canada, and India); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596
n.10 (1977) (noting that of sixty major nations surveyed in 1965, only three retained the
death penalty for rape); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958) (reporting that a
survey of eighty-four countries revealed only two that imposed denationalization as a
penalty for desertion).
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The first in this line of cases is Trop v. Dulles. 10 In Trop, Justice Warren
does use foreign materials, 11 but he enunciates no clear justification for
their use.
Concurring in United States v. Then, 12 Judge Calabresi argues that the
experiences of Germany and Italy might someday influence the
interpretation of our Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. 13 Judge
Calabresi justifies this assertion by noting that the constitutional systems
in those countries are our "constitutional offspring." 14
On one hand there is Justice Brennan's use of foreign materials in
Eighth Amendment analysis. His use is limited in scope, but poorly
justified. On the other hand, Judge Calabresi supplies a more thorough
justification, but there is no clear limitation to the extent of foreign
influence under his reasoning. These different approaches raise the
question: Can foreign experience properly inform interpretation of the
United States Constitution? 15
Judges and academics are divided as to whether the resolution of
constitutional disputes must turn wholly on domestic inputs or if there is
in fact any room in United States constitutional jurisprudence to learn
from the experiences of other nations. 16 Objections to the practice are
10. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
11. See id. at 102-03.
12. United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995).
13. See id. at 468-69.
14. Id. at 469.
15. The answer to this question is necessarily linked to a court's interpretive
method. Implicit in every debate over constitutional issues is a second debate as to how
those issues are to be decided; that is, what interpretive methodology should be
employed in reaching a decision. For a historical account and overview of several
dominant interpretive theories, see PHILIP BOBB11T, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982).
There is no single accepted method, and the methods espoused take varied and
distinctive forms. For a recent attempt to illuminate the debate over interpretive
methods, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L.
REV. 535 (1999).
16. See Choudhry, supra note 7, at 823; Jackson, supra note 7, at 583; Tushnet,
supra note 7, at 1226-28. Choudhry, Jackson, and Tushnet each support some form of
comparative analysis in constitutional interpretation. The current members of the
Supreme Court also differ regarding the propriety of comparative analysis. Several
justices have expressed support for the use of foreign materials. See Knight v. Florida,
528 U.S. 990, 995 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating foreign experiences can be
useful even though not binding); William Rehnquist, Constitutional CourtsComparative Remarks, in GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FlmJREA GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 411,412 (Paul Kirchof & Donald P. Kommers eds.,
1993) (commenting on the growth of comparative law); Elizabeth Greathouse, Justices
See Joint Issues with the EU, WASH. POST, July 9, 1998, at A24 (reporting Justices
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premised upon the assertions that constitutional solutions should derive
from purely domestic sources and that fundamental differences in
constitutional systems will render attempts to transplant solutions
ineffective. 17 The purpose of this discussion is to show (1) that courts do
in fact use comparative analysis in the interpretation of the Constitution,
(2) that courts use foreign materials in three distinct manners and within
a limited framework, and (3) that the framework dissuades the
objections to the use of foreign materials by limiting the scope of the use
and the impact of those foreign materials.
Part II of this Comment provides a brief background of comparative
analysis. This discussion is followed in Part ill by an overview of the
controversy surrounding the use of comparative analysis in domestic
constitutional law. An examination of the motivation for providing
support or justification for interpretive methods, in Part IV, completes the
foundation necessary for the rest of the analysis to proceed.
Courts use comparative analysis in three different ways. The critical
feature of each method, and the main thrust of this Comment, is that the
use of comparative analysis is introduced into an opinion and structured
such that the concerns voiced by the primary criticisms are deflected.
This idea is summarized in Part V and is elaborated upon in Parts VI and
VIL Courts use comparative materials to (1) illustrate the existence of
relevant issues and to justify the court's consideration of those issues, 18
(2) provide the reader with a better understanding of independent reasoning
by highlighting unique features of American constitutionalism, 19 and (3)
illustrate possible empirical consequences where the court considers a
departure from or modification of existing practice or doctrine. 20 Each
mode is discussed in turn, using actual case examples.
II. BACKGROUND
Comparative analysis, or the study of foreign legal systems, is not a
novel concept. 21 A great deal of comparative work has been done in the
O'Connor and Breyer express the possibility of citing decisions by the European Court
of Justice). But see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) (writing for
the Court, Justice Scalia, calls the use of foreign experiences "inappropriate" to the
interpretation of a constitution).
17. See discussion infra notes 25-38 and accompanying text.
18. See discussion infra notes 71-154 and accompanying text.
19. See discussion infra notes 155-74 and accompanying text.
20. See discussion infra notes 175-236 and accompanying text.
21. See generally MAURO CAPPELLETTI & WILLIAM COHEN, COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1979). Comparative study finds its roots
in the civil law nations of Europe, subsequently spreading to common law systems. See
Christopher Osakwe, K. Zweigert & H. Kotz's An Introduction to Comparative law, 62
TuL. L. REV. 1507, 1507 (1988) (book review).
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area of constitutional law. 22 In recent years, the spread of constitutional
democracies23 has catalyzed the reemergence of comparative analysis as
a significant issue in constitutional interpretation. The United States
Supreme Court, however, has been reluctant to adopt the process. The
Supreme Court's reluctance to incorporate foreign experiences into the
interpretation of constitutional issues contrasts markedly with practices
in various other constitutional democracies. 24
,
22. This work has focused on the identification and illumination of structural
similarities and differences among systems, comparisons of doctrine, and more
complicated examinations of one nation's jurisprudential methods and assumptions in
light of another's. See Choudhry, supra note 7, at 827-30. Until recently, however, the
potential impact of comparative analysis on the actual interpretation of constitutions has
been largely ignored. See id. Thus, a significant amount of work has used comparative
materials to examine different constitutional systems, but little of it has addressed the
actual use of comparative materials in constitutional interpretation. Although the amount
of work in this field remains limited, several scholars have recently examined the
implications of comparative analysis on the interpretation of constitutions. See sources
cited supra note 7. Despite the relatively light academic treatment of comparative
analysis in the resolution of constitutional issues, some courts have actively employed
the comparative method. The Canadian Supreme Court has employed the method, and
the South African Supreme Court does so with a specific constitutional mandate. See
sources cited infra note 24.
23. See Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REv.
771 (1997) (discussing the recent spread of constitutional democracies); Irwin P.
Stotzky, Establishing Deliberative Democracy: Moving from Misery to Poverty with
Dignity, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. Rev. 79, 79 (commenting upon the "dramatic
expansion of interest in the ideas of constitutionalism"); see also David A. Strauss,
Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Cm. L. REV. 877, 890 (1996)
(recognizing the present as "a time of constitutional ferment in much of the world").
24. Many examples emerge in South African and Canadian court opinions where
foreign experiences influence the resolution of domestic controversy. For examples of
instances in which South African courts have utilized comparative analysis, see State v.
Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391 (CC), available at http://www.concourt.gov.za/
judgments (banning capital punishment as cruel and unusual punishment under South
Africa's Interim Constitution); Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1996 (3) SALR 850 (CC),
available at http://www.concourt.gov.za/judgments (holding that, under the Interim
Constitution, the Bill of Rights did not apply to litigation between private parties); In re
National Education Policy Bill 83 of 1995, 1996 SALR 1176, 1220-42 (CC), available
at http://www.concourt.gov.za/judgments. Canadian courts have openly incorporated the
influence of U.S. decisions in the interpretation of constitutional issues impacting the land
rights of aboriginal peoples into the interpretation of Canada's Charter of Rights. See
Choudhry, supra note 7, at 866. For examples of cases developing Canadian doctrine in
the area of aboriginal rights and incorporating the reasoning of U.S. courts, see Van der
Peet v. The Queen, [1996] S.C.R. 507, 541; Calder v. Attorney-Gen. of British Columbia,
[1973] S.C.R 313; St Catharine's Milling & Lumber Co. v. The Queen, [1887] S.C.R.
577. Examples of comparative analysis in constitutional adjudication, however, are not
limited to these two nations alone. Israel, for example, has drawn extensively from
Canada's treatment of their Charter of Rights. See generally Adam M. Dodek, The
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A. The Domestic Controversy
There are several significant objections to comparative analysis in
constitutional adjudication. Some objections arise because the use of
comparative materials conflicts with the critic's preferred interpretive
method. 25 Originalism and textualism are particularly incompatible with
comparative analysis. 26
Charter ... in the Holy Land?, 8 CONST. F. 5 (1996).
Canadian use of comparative jurisprudence, while more extensive then that of U.S.
courts, pales in comparison to the practice of South African courts. South African courts
have used foreign experiences in the interpretation of both their interim and new
constitutions. For a good general discussion of the use of comparative analysis in South
Africa, see generally Hoyt Webb, The Constitutional Court of South Africa: Rights
Interpretation and Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 205 (1998).
What is more impressive, and may to a great extent marginalize the influence of the
South African experience on attempts to justify comparative analysis in U.S. courts, is
the fact that both the temporary interim constitution and the new constitution specifically
authorize the use of comparative analysis in judicial review. See S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, §
39, available at http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/constitution/saconst02.html#39. The
United States Constitution provides no explicit mandate for judicial review, although it
has been interpreted as authorizing the practice. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I
Cranch) 137, 173-74 (1803). Necessarily, then, the text of the Constitution provides no
clear license to invoke foreign materials in its interpretation. In light of the South
African court's clear license to use comparative analysis, that court has not had to
provide normative justification for the use of comparative analysis in the absence of a
specific license. As a result, South African courts have not provided any justification
that may be borrowed by American courts. The South African experience is, however,
still informative in several ways: it provides empirical evidence of the practical results of
comparative analysis in constitutional adjudication, illustrates the potential benefits of
examining foreign experiences, and proves the viability of a system using comparative
analysis.
25. For a practical summary of the various widely accepted methods of
constitutional interpretation, see generally BOBBITT, supra note 15.
26. The intentions of the original founders of the Constitution are, to some degree,
always fundamental to U.S. constitutional adjudication. Some commentators propose a
very central role for these original intentions. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 144 (1990); Antonin Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 862-65 (1989). Others, who may
discount the role of originalism, are still hesitant to claim that originalism serves no
purpose whatsoever. See Strauss, supra note 23, at 881. Originalism and its variants are
hard to square with comparative analysis. It is no simple endeavor to show how the
constitutional experiences of Australia or Switzerland might inform us as to what the
intentions of the original founders may have been. However, if the question is framed
differently (for instance: how might the use of foreign materials inform the resolution of
an issue, such that the result reflects the intentions of the original drafters), foreign
experiences may serve as indicators of the possible empirical results of any particular
interpretation. A study of practices in foreign nations may help illuminate whether a
proposed interpretation will in fact produce an empirical result in line with the intentions
of the founders. For the proposition that foreign experiences may illuminate empirical
consequences, see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
The same criticism, that comparative analysis is not cohesive with the interpretive
method, may be made, though perhaps to a lesser degree, by proponents of text based
interpretation. For a discussion of textualism, see BOBBITT, supra note 15, ch. 3. Text
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Another line of criticism stems from the related notions of American
"exceptionalism"27 and legal "particularism."28 Exceptionalism can be
thought of as the idea that the United States Constitution is unique and
that the experience surrounding it is unique. 29 Particularism is the very
similar idea that eonstitutions are unique expressions of national character.30
Particularists claim that a constitution is defined by its people.31 If
particularist claims are valid, foreign experiences may be inappropriate
to the interpretation of a constitution.
Criticism of the use of foreign materials in constitutional adjudication
also focuses on the possible impact of variations between legal systems.
Differences in legal systems are unavoidable. Even where they may
appear minor, these differences will quite often have a significant impact
on the validity of any reasoning derived from comparative materials. 32
Direct borrowing or transplantation of legal solutions or doctrines will,
in the opinion of many scholars, be severely impacted by fundamental
cultural and social differences. 33 In the opinions of some comparative
based interpretive methods seek to understand the text in terms of the modern social
context. See id. It is conceivable that foreign experiences could play some role in a
court's understanding of modern society. Nonetheless, if originalism or textualism is
central to a particular interpretive method, the proponent of that method may be hesitant
to consider foreign experiences.
27. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE nm PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 3 n.12 (1991)
(expressing the sentiment that the United States should break free of European influence
in defining itself and its Constitution); Michael Kammen, The United States
Constitution, Public Opinion, and the Problem of American Exceptionalism, in THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: ROOTS, RIGHTS AND REsPONSIBILITIES 267 (A. E. Dick
Howard ed., 1992) (commenting upon the longstanding tradition of exceptionalism in
American history).
28. See Choudhry, supra note 7, at 830-32. For criticism of the use of
comparative analysis in constitutional interpretation on the grounds of particularism, see
generally William P. Alford, On the Limits of "Grand Theory" in Comparative Law, 61
WASH. L. REV. 945 (1986); George P. Fletcher, Constitutional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L.
REV. 737 (1993); Frederick Schauer, Free Speech and the Cultural Contingency of
Constitutional Categories, 14 CARDOZO L. REY. 865 (1993).
29. See MARK TuSHNET, TAK1NG TIIE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM TIIE COURTS
181-82, 188-93 (1999) (viewing the Constitution as an expression of American
character).
30. See Choudhry, supra note 7, at 830-32.
31. See id.
32. See Jackson, supra note 7, at 595; see also ALAN WATSON, LEGAL
TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the
advantages and disadvantages oflegal transplants).
33. See J.H.H. Weiler & Joel P. Trachtman, European Constitutionalism and Its
Discontents, 17 NW. J. INT'LL. & Bus. 354,355 (1997); see also Daniel H. Foote, The
Roles of Comparative Law: Inaugural Lecture for the Dan Fenno Henderson
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scholars, transplantation simply cannot work and, "nothing can be
translated."34 Other critics counter that basic principles of constitutional
law are "the same around the world." 35 If basic principles are indeed the
same, fears that foreign experiences will be misinterpreted may be
exaggerated.
An examination of the relatively few cases employing foreign
materials in any significant manner reveals a rather dramatic shift with
respect to early and later cases. 36 The shift is not in the positive
justification for the practice, but in the manner in which comparative
materials are employed. While none of these cases contain a specific or
well-developed justification for the inclusion of foreign materials, 37 the
Professorship in East Asian Legal Studies, 73 WASH. L. REv. 25, 36 (1998).
34. John C. Reitz, How to Do Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 620-21
(1998). Practical problems are also important. The limited availability of documents
from other systems, particularly non-English speaking courts, may detract from the
practical impact of foreign materials. See Jackson, supra note 7, at 595. Simple, but
fundamental, differences in the style in which opinions are crafted may inhibit accurate
interpretation of a foreign jurisdiction's law. See id.
35. DAVIDBEATIY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 10 (1995).
36. Early examples of foreign influence in constitutional adjudication tend to
employ a technique more along the lines of borrowing. See Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) (determining that the right to expel aliens is an
"inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation" by using
European examples); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 187-89 (1880) (borrowing
from England the notion that the power to hold for contempt is a judicial function, and
can not, in matters of private rights, be enforced by the legislature). These earlier cases
engage in lengthy discussions of foreign practice, derive the underlying legal principles,
then transplant these principles into the domestic constitutional doctrine. See Fong Yue
Ting, 149 U.S. at 707-11; Thompson, 103 U.S. at 183-90. In more recent opinions, the
Court uses comparative materials in a less central role. See, e.g., Washington v.
Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 732-35 (1997) (illustrating the existence of a legitimate state
interest in restricting physician-assisted suicide by using Dutch experiences with
euthanasia); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 577-601 (1961) (using the practices
of foreign nations to suggest that the United States Constitution contains limitations on
police power that are deserving of consideration).
37. This is not to say that no justification for comparative analysis in constitutional
adjudication has been offered. A series of opinions cite Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958), as authority for the proposition that foreign materials may inform certain aspects
of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. In Trop,
however, Justice Warren provides no explicit normative justification for the use of
comparative materials. Alternatively, Judge Guido Calabresi asserts that the common
lineage of different constitutions supports the use of foreign experience in the
interpretation of those constitutions. See United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 468-69 (2d
Cir. 1995) (concurring opinion). But these attempts to promote the use of comparative
analysis in constitutional adjudication have not offered any specific guidance as to how
these materials should be used, nor have they addressed any of the criticisms of
comparative analysis.
Two scholars, Mark Tushnet and Sujit Choudhry, have proposed various methods by
which courts may employ comparative analysis in constitutional adjudication. See
Choudhry, supra note 7; Tushnet supra note 7. Both authors also offer a normative
justification for each proposed method.
Tushnet describes what he calls a functionalist approach and an expressivist approach.
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later cases have integrated foreign materials into their interpretive method in
such a manner as to better preserve the fundamentally domestic roots of
any legal conclusions.38 Justification for the use of comparative analysis

See generally Tushnet, supra note 7. Functionalism asserts that particular constitutional
provisions create structural arrangements designed to accomplish particular functions
within a governmental framework. See id. at 1228. Comparative analysis may be used
to illuminate the various functions and to show how constitutional provisions in other
countries promote the same function. See id. This examination may reveal an
opportunity to use foreign mechanisms, designed to achieve equivalent functions, within
the U.S. constitutional scheme. See id. Tushnet finds justification for the functionalist
approach where the Constitution requires an empirical inquiry. See id. at 1235-36. A
determination of standing requires, in some instances, that the court determine whether
to resolve the issue will alter the relationship amongst the three branches. This is a
functional analysis, and Tushnet argues that "functional inquiries are inherently
empirical" and that "in resolving empirical inquiries it makes sense for a decisionmaker
to use whatever empirical information he or she can. In this way, a functionalist analysis
of Article III does indeed license comparative inquiry." Id. at 1235.
Expressivisim contends that "constitutions help constitute the nation, to varying
degrees in different nations, offering to each nation's people a way of understanding
themselves as political beings." Id. at 1228. Comparison of one system to another
provides an opportunity to learn about one's own constitutional system. See id. at 122829. The license to use the expressivist method comes from the basic nature of the
informed and educated judge. It is one more input, like knowledge of history,
philosophy, or literature that a decision-maker may use to inform his interpretation of the
Constitution. See id. at 1236-37.
Choudhry proposes three methods not entirely dissimilar to those proposed by
Tushnet. See generally Chaudhry, supra note 7. The first proposed method, universalist
interpretation (similar to Tushnet's functionalism, but oriented more towards individual
rights), expresses the notion that "constitutional guarantees are cut from a universal
cloth, and, hence, that all constitutional courts are engaged in the identification,
interpretation, and application of the same set of norms. Those norms are comprehended
as transcendent legal principles that are logically prior to positive rules of law and legal
doctrines." Id. at 825.
The second method, genealogical interpretation, focuses on the relationships of
"descent and history'' among related constitutional systems. Id. These relationships are
offered as justification for the importation of constitutional solutions from one system to
another. See id.
Choudhry's third method, dialogical interpretation, proposes that courts may "identify
the normative and factual assumptions underlying their own constitutional jurisprudence
by engaging with comparable jurisprudence of other jurisdictions." Id. Similarities may
warrant the importation of ideas, and differences "may sharpen an awareness of
constitutional difference or distinctiveness." Id.
The bulk of each author's discussion relates to the use of comparative analysis by
foreign courts, rather than interpretation of the United States Constitution.
38. For example, the decision in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961), is
derived directly from existing precedent, despite the extensive discussion of foreign
practice. See discussion infra notes 71-117 and accompanying text. The decision in
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), is rooted in domestic practice, tradition,
and precedent. See discussion infra notes 177-215 and accompanying text.
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in constitutional interpretation is furthered by employing foreign
materials within the context of an interpretive framework based on
precedent that both focuses and limits the foreign material's impact. The
limiting effect of this framework prevents the occurrence of the dual
risks, borrowing and nondomestic solutions, most often cited by critics of
comparative analysis in constitutional interpretation.

B. Judicial Review and the Need for Justification
The impetus to support an interpretive theory with an underlying
justification originates in concern for the integrity of the judicial process
and respect for the rule of law. Neither judicial review itself, nor,
consequently, any guidelines for the exercise of judicial review, is
explicitly established by the text of the Constitution. 39 The justification
for these practices must then depend, at least in part, upon extrinsic
sources.40 Just as any theory of interpretation is more effective when
justified by some underlying rationale, the use of comparative materials
within a specific interpretive method needs justification.
Controversy over judicial review existed prior to ratification of the
Constitution and persisted for some time after. 41 Justice Marshall, in
Marbury v. Madison, 42 settled the issue. 43 The most effective of Justice
Marshall's arguments was grounded in the notion of the Constitution as
the supreme law, but law nonetheless. If the Constitution is law, then
interpretation of the Constitution remains within the scope of the Court's
powers enunciated in Article III. 44 The practice of treating the
Constitution as law, rather then something of a different nature, draws
support from Alexander Hamilton's statement that, "[a] constitution is,
in fact, and must be regarded by the judges as, a fundamental law. It
therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning
of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body." 45 Hamilton
justifies this notion by describing the Constitution as the will of the
people, and asserting that the will of the people should always trump the
acts of elected representatives. 46

39. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
40. See Fallon, supra note 15, at 539.
41. For a brief description of the origins of judicial review in the United States, see
JOHN ARTHUR, WORDS THAT BIND 8-16 (1995).
42. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
43. Justice Marshall's opinion has been credited with providing the "classical
defense" for judicial review. See ARTHUR, supra note 41, at 10.
44. See ARTHUR, supra note 41, at 13-14.
45. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
46. See id. at 467-68.
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Once judicial review is established, various means of performing the
task begin to develop.47 An extensive body of literature, enunciating
explicit normative justifications for each method within the specific
context of American constitutional jurisprudence, supports various
interpretive constitutional methodologies.48
In Constitutional Fate, Philip Bobbitt concludes his discussion of
judicial review by declaring that there is no "fundamental principle"
underlying and legitimizing the process of judicial review. 49 Judicial
review, contends Bobbitt, needs no foundation, and further, none can be
derived. 50 Legal truths do exist, but only in the context of a specific
structural argument or convention, and there is no way to definitively
choose a particular convention. 51 Bobbitt's conclusions might allow one
to then ponder the need to actually justify a chosen interpretive method
for its own sake, but this conclusion tends to leave an unpleasant taste.
In framing his own discussion of comparative analysis in constitutional
interpretation, Sujit Chaudhry nicely puts a more attractive proposition.52
The need to justify a mode of constitutional interpretation, he asserts,
arises from "the premise that law is the source of, and the means for the
exercise of, the coercive power of the state."53 The exercise of power by
the executive and legislative branches is legitimized through "public
justification" of the law via the courts. 54 This process of justification is
accomplished through reasoned discourse; the courts legitimate the
exercise of power by serving as a forum where lawmakers are able to
enunciate their reasons.55
The process of reason giving, however, does not end with the
lawmakers. It is equally important that courts give public justification
for their own decisions, and this requirement of reason giving extends to
justification of the interpretive methods employed in arriving at a
decision. For Chaudhry, a court's interpretive methodology defines its
47. For a summary, see BOBBITT, supra note 15. For a discussion of the
philosophical justification for judicial review and a discussion of the various means by
which it may be accomplished, see ARTHUR, supra note 41.
48. See generally Fallon, supra note 15.
49. See BOBBITT, supra note 15, at 237.
50. Seeid.
51. See id. at 234.
52. See Choudhry, supra note 7, at 824.
53. Id. Choudhry, in his discussion, is concerned only with comparative analysis,
but his reasoning may transcend methodologies.
54. Id.
55. Seeid.
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"institutional identity," and "the very legitimacy of judicial institutions
hinges on interpretive methodology."56
Thus, the integrity of judicial review depends on the use of interpretive
methods that can themselves be justified. The question then becomes
whether or not American courts can justify the use of comparative
analysis as an interpretive method (or, more precisely, as part of an
interpretive method) or, alternatively, whether our particular form of
constitutionalism is not receptive to the influence of foreign experiences.
In other words, does the explicit use of comparative analysis undermine
the legitimacy of American judicial review?
C. A Justification in the Method

Judicial proponents of comparative analysis in constitutional
interpretation have, in some cases, adapted the manner in which
comparative materials are used within the interpretive framework so as
to address the primary concerns of critics.57 Positive justifications based
on ancestral linkage,58 functional similarity59 or empirical illumination60
(which separately or individually lend support to the use of comparative
materials) are supplemented by adapting the means in which these
materials are used in order to meet criticisms.
Supporters of
comparative analysis have used foreign materials within interpretive
frameworks, and in such ways, as to allow for the material's productive
contribution to the interpretive process, while simultaneously limiting
the effects of foreign materials objected to by critics of their use. By
meeting the concerns of critics, the supporters of comparative analysis,
both explicit and implied, are better able to justify the use of foreign
materials. Any amount of positive support for a legal or interpretive
contention may falter if criticisms are left unaddressed. The early cases
explicitly employing foreign experiences illustrate this problem. 61 More
56. Id.; see also Tushnet, supra note 7, at 1229-30.
[C]onstitutional interpretation is an exercise within U.S. constitutional law,
which has its distinctive methods and sources on which interpreters may
justifiably rely. We must know what methods and sources authorize
interpreters to refer to constitutional experience elsewhere before we can
examine how that experience aids us in interpreting the Constitution.
Tushnet, supra note 7, at 1229-30.
57. See discussion supra notes 25-38 and accompanying text.
58. See United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1995).
59. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976-78 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
60. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 734-35 (1997).
61. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893). In Fong Yue
Ting, the majority opinion focused on the traditional powers of sovereigns in other
nations. See id. at 707-11. The constitutionality of the act depended on the extent and
nature of the government's power. See id. at 711. The Court's determination is made
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recent cases utilizing foreign experiences have employed them in such a
manner as to address the primary criticisms. 62
Objections to the use of comparative materials tend to stem either
from fears over the practical complications of direct "borrowing," or
from exceptionalist or particularist concerns that constitutional interpretation
be rooted in the American experience. These objections are countered
by basing any interpretive exercise employing foreign materials in an
interpretive method centered on the examination of established precedent.63
almost entirely by analogy to foreign practice. The nature of the opinion, and its use of
foreign authority, leaves it vulnerable to the criticisms of the two dissents. Justice
Brewer, in dissent, emphasizes the unique nature of the United States' federal
government and the Constitution's role in emphasizing the very deliberate departure
from the practices of other states. See id. at 737-38. Justice Brewer writes:
The governments of other nations have elastic powers-ours is fixed and
bounded by a written constitution. The expulsion of a race may be within the
inherent powers of a despotism. History, before the adoption of this
Constitution, was not destitute of examples of the exercise of such a power;
and its framers were familiar with history, and wisely, as it seems to me, they
gave to this government no general power to banish.
Id. at 737.
Justice Field, echoing Justice Brewer, objects to the importation of the notion of a
sovereign's inherent power to banish. Id. at 757. Justice Field contends that "even if
that power were exercised by every government of Europe, it would have no bearing in
these cases." Id. Essentially, Justices Breyer and Field object to the foreign, rather than
domestic, source of the interpretive solution. The majority opinion is vulnerable to this
criticism in two ways. First, it does not offer a positive justification for the use of
foreign practices to reach an interpretive conclusion regarding the Constitution, and
second, the manner of use leaves the author of the opinion unable to effectively answer
the criticism of the dissenting Justices. The solution to the interpretive puzzle has its
source in foreign experience, not in an examination of domestic law, history, or tradition.
62. See, e.g., Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Justice Breyer uses comparative materials to argue for the consideration of an issue,
rather than for an actual conclusion. See discussion infra notes 119-54 and
accompanying text Justice Frankfurter employs comparative materials in the same
manner in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961). See discussion infra notes 77118 and accompanying text Other examples exist in which courts have used
comparative materials in a limited manner. See discussion infra notes 155-236 and
accompanying text
63. Phillip Bobbitt calls interpretive methods centered on precedent "doctrinal."
See BOBBITI, supra note 15, at 43-47. A court must follow existing precedent,
distinguish it, or overrule it. See id. at 43.
Some scholars propose that constitutional adjudication takes a form that is essentially
that of the common law. See HARRY H. WEI.l.INGTON, lNIERPRETING 1HE CONS1111JTION:
THE SUPREME COURT AND 1HE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 127 (1990); Frederick
Schauer, ls the Common Law Law?, 11 CAL. L. REV. 455, 470 & n.41 (1989) (book
review). See generally Strauss, supra note 23. This need not come as a surprise
considering the central role the common law method plays in our courts and teaching
institutions. See Strauss, supra note 23, at 887-88.
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Comparative materials are employed in three distinct facets of the
interpretive process. Justices have employed comparative materials, for
instance, to help illustrate the existence of an issue and to justify the
Court's address of that issue.64 Justices may also support the adoption of
one line of reasoning over another by using comparative materials to
highlight the unique aspects of the Constitution. 65 Lastly, justices have
Strauss argues that the accepted notions of how the Constitution is interpreted cannot
offer a complete understanding of actual practice. See id. at 890. For example, neither
textualism nor originalism accurately reflect actual practice. See id. Where the text
speaks clearly, there is no practical need for careful consideration by the courts. See,
e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1244 (1987). Sometimes original intentions are
decisive. See Strauss, supra note 23, at 881. Often, however, the actual practice of
courts cannot easily be squared with the text, and original intentions count for little or
nothing. See id.
Text in particular, and original intentions to a lesser degree, cannot be ignored entirely.
At some level, judicial decisions must be reconcilable with the Constitution's text.
However, a realistic assessment reveals that the text is, for the most part, treated quite
liberally in written opinions. See id. Entire opinions often completely neglect any
specific discussion of the actual wording of the Constitution. See id. The intentions of
the Constitution's framers are always a factor, at least in the sense that, to some degree,
they have contributed to the development of current doctrines. Original intentions have
long been, and remain, an authoritative basis for constitutional interpretation. Despite
the predominance of original intentions in interpretive theory, they are hardly ever the
sole or major determinative factor in a court's reasoning, and original intentions are
always susceptible to contradiction or alternative interpretation. See id. For discussions
of the applications of originalism, see Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56
N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 472-500 (1981); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding
of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885 (1985).
In many opinions, precedent plays the central or dominant role in the Court's
determinations. See, e.g., Charles Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, 107 HARV. L. REv.
1140 (1994). In many instances, constitutional issues are resolved without a single quote
from the Constitution. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997);
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961). Issues are decided wholly on whether or
not the facts of the case at hand can be distinguished from precedent, and where they
cannot, the Court may engage in a discussion of the desirability of breaking with
established doctrine. For an overview of the manner in which courts are bound by, work
with, and modify existing precedents or doctrine, see HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW
362-648 (1958). As the various Constitutional doctrines have evolved away from the
strict interpretations of text and original intentions, the doctrines developed by the Court
have developed an independent legitimacy. As put by David A. Strauss, "our written
constitution has, by now, become part of an evolutionary common law system, and the
common law-rather then any model based on the interpretation of codified lawprovides the best way to understand the practices of American constitutional law."
Strauss, supra note 23, at 885.
64. See Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999), in which Justice Breyer uses
foreign experiences to illustrate the need to consider the possible constitutional
prohibitions on extremely lengthy delays of executions. Consider also Culombe, 367
U.S. 568, in which Justice Frankfurter uses examples of foreign experience to argue that
the constitutional limitations of police interrogation warrant the Court's consideration.
65. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S.811, 828 (1997), in which Chief Justice Rehnquist
uses foreign practice to highlight the Constitution's distinct standing requirements.
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used foreign materials to inform the empirical consequences of differing
treatments of doctrine. 66
This discussion explores how comparative materials have, in recent
cases, been used in constitutional interpretation such that they are not
central to any conclusion reached, and that the resulting interpretation of
the Constitution could stand independently of foreign support. Solutions
to constitutional questions are neither borrowed, nor are they rooted in
any source other than domestic. Foreign materials are used only to
clarify, or lend support to, the reasoning behind discrete steps in the
interpretive process. Just as the foreign materials are presented so as to
affect only specific and limited aspects of the reasoning process, the
central role of precedent dramatically limits the possible impact or
overextension of the foreign materials. 67

66. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 734 (1997), in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist considers the Dutch experience with euthanasia in assessing the
various state interests in maintaining a statute banning assisted suicide. See also United
States v. Walton, 207 F.3d 694, 698 n.5 (4th Cir. 2000) (using similar foreign practice to
bolster the contention that there is no constitutional requirement that a trial court define
"beyond a reasonable doubt").
67. Proponents of more traditional textual or originalist interpretive standards
promote the tendency of these interpretive techniques to limit the impact of a judge's
moral disposition on the resolution of constitutional issues. See Strauss, supra note 23,
at 925. The primary criticism of common law type constitutional interpretation is that it
does not sufficiently limit the judiciary's discretion. See id. Strauss argues that this
criticism of the common law method is inaccurate. Id. at 925-26. The common law has
developed a self-limiting system. Precedent binds judges, and where they wish to break
ties with an existing doctrine, the integrity of the court depends upon the showing of
good and well-considered reasons. See id. at 926-28. Strauss sees the limiting effect as
arising from two different traits of the common law method. The first, traditionalism, is
the idea that there is a strong presumption in favor of precedent because previous
holdings have stood the test of time and represent a sort of "accumulated wisdom." Id. at
891-92. The second aspect, conventionalism, encourages respect for precedent on the
grounds that some issues are better settled, even if not ideally. See id. at 906.
Where a court proposes to break with established doctrine it may do so upon a
showing that moral or policy concerns are sufficient to outweigh the presumption in
favor of established practice. Courts must strike a balance between respect for precedent
and the current needs of society. "The reason for adhering to judgments made in the past
is the counsel of humility and the value of experience. Moral or policy arguments can be
sufficiently strong to outweigh those traditionalist concerns to some degree, and to the
extent they do, traditionalism must give way." Id. at 902.
For an alternative view of the importance of precedent, see generally James C.
Rehnquist, The Power that Shall Be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, the
Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. REv. 345 (1986).
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ill. THREE USES OF COMPARATIVE MATERIALS

The Court has used comparative materials in three distinct fashions.
In each case the predominant focus of the interpretive effort is on review
and treatment of relevant precedent. Also, in each case, the role of
comparative materials is limited (not to be confused with being made
insignificant) by the interpreter's reliance on doctrine.
The three uses of comparative materials in written opinions are: ( 1) to
illustrate the existence of, or define, relevant issues and justify the
Court's consideration of those issues; 68 (2) to provide the reader with a
better understanding of independent reasoning by highlighting unique
features of American constitutionalism; 69 and (3) to illustrate possible
empirical consequences where the Court considers a departure from, or
modification of, existing practice or doctrine. 70
A. Definition and Justification of Relevant Issues

Comparative materials have been used to help define relevant issues
and to justify judicial scrutiny of those issues. Before a court may
embark upon the task of resolving a dispute, the court must first
determine, with some specificity, what the relevant issue or issues are. 71
More importantly, the court must also justify the exercise of its appellate
authority over the presumably well-considered and good-faith determination
of the lower court. Support for a court's consideration of issues is
especially important where the issue or issues are constitutional in
nature. 72 A decision on constitutional questions practically removes the
issue from the consideration of the legislature and the democratic
process.73 This distinctive aspect of constitutional adjudication demands
that a court be particularly thorough in making the determination to
settle disputes on constitutional grounds. 74 Only after relevant issues are
isolated, and their consideration supported, can the search for relevant

68. See discussion infra notes 71-154 and accompanying text.
69. See discussion infra notes 155-74 and accompanying text.
70. See discussion infra notes 175-236 and accompanying text.
71. The need to clearly articulate the issue to be addressed is particularly strong
with regard to the Supreme Court and lower Article III courts. The various requirements
of justiciability demand a clear understanding of the issues at hand. For example, the
standards for standing require that, in all controversies, the nature of the harm must be
defined. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). Some
issues, particularly those involving questions of federalism, may require a determination
as to whether the issue is a nonjusticable political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 198-99 (1962).
72. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,502 (1977).
73. See id.
74. See id.
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precedent begin. Comparative materials or foreign experiences can provide
valuable insight as to what really may be at issue and reinforce the
importance of addressing those issues.
The following discussion focuses on two cases, each of which uses
comparative materials to help the court define the relevant issue and
justify the decision to consider the materials. The first is the majority
opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Culombe v. Connecticut.75 The second
is the more recent use by Justice Breyer in his 1999 dissent to the
Court's denial of certiorari in Knight v. Florida. 76 Both justices employ
foreign materials in a very similar fashion.
1. Culombe v. Connecticut

In Culombe, Justice Frankfurter uses foreign experience to support the
necessity of the constitutional analysis that follows. The Court's
conclusion, however, is ultimately derived entirely from an examination
of existing precedent.77
The structure of Justice Frankfurter's opinion is important. The
Court's treatment of precedent is preceded by an introductory overview
and a lengthy discussion incorporating many examples of foreign
practice. This discussion of foreign practice gives the reader a stronger
sense of the gravity of the issues addressed. It also illuminates the fact
that, while the liberty issues addressed may be universal, the treatment is
not necessarily homogenous. The following discussion illustrates the
various portions of Justice Frankfurter's opinion. In doing so, it emphasizes
the role of comparative materials and distinguishes the portion of the
opinion integrating foreign practice from the portion where an actual
examination of the constitutional implications of precedent occurs.
Culombe addressed the petitioner's claim that the admission into
75. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961). Justice Frankfurter was an
enthusiastic advocate of the use of comparative materials. In several cases, for instance,
Justice Frankfurter applies foreign experiences to issues of federalism. See Freeman v.
Hewit, 329 U.S. 249,251 n.1 (1946) (majority opinion); New York v. United States, 326
U.S. 572, 580 n.4 (1946) (majority opinion); United States v. County of Allegheny, 322
U.S. 174, 198 (1944) (dissenting opinion); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287,
305-06 (1942) (concurring opinion); State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 18384 (1942) (concurring opinion); Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 490-91 (1939)
(concurring opinion). For another decision in the area of Fourth Amendment rights, see
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17 (1945) (concurring opinion).
76. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999).
77. See Culombe, 367 U.S. at 601-22.
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evidence of his murder confession was an error and a violation of his
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. 78 The petitioner, Culombe,
was of questionable mental competency,79 and his treatment by police
officers, including the duration of detainment, 80 access to counsel81 and
emotional manipulations, 82 raised questions as to the validity of the
murder confession obtained during that detainment. 83
An overview of Justice Frankfurter's opinion reveals the structure of
his reasoning. Justice Frankfurter begins his analysis with a review of
the related precedent and domestic concems. 84 Justice Frankfurter's
introduction gives the reader the background necessary to understand the
analysis that follows.
In light of the proposition that "one cannot adopt 'an undiscriminating
hostility to mere interrogation,"'85 Justice Frankfurter frames the relevant
issue by asking what "characteristics" of interrogation are allowable,
consistent with conceptions of the "Anglo-American accusatorial process."86
The first step in Justice Frankfurter's analysis of the issue is to review
the competing concerns: the need for interrogation, the methods that
necessarily accompany interrogation, the dangers of withholding counsel,
and the risk that providing counsel will impede the police in solving the
crime. 87 With these factors in mind, Justice Frankfurter concludes: "The
78. See id. at 570. Culombe is Justice Frankfurter's "ambitious attempt" to
provide lower courts much needed guidance in application of the voluntariness test for
confessions. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND PERSPECTIVES 568-69 (1999).
Most commentators
considered the attempt overly complicated and of little help in practical applications by
lower courts. See id.
79. Culombe is described as a "thirty-three-year-old mental defective of the moron
class with ... a mental age of nine to nine and a half years." Culombe, 367 U.S. at 620.
Culombe was "suggestible" and subject to intimidation. Id. at 621.
80. Culombe was detained on a Saturday afternoon, and questioned repeatedly
until finally confessing to murder on the following Wednesday night. See id. at 607-11.
Culombe was questioned repeatedly during the course of his detainment, and the delay in
arraignment (from Saturday until Tuesday) amounted to a violation of state law. See id.
at 609-11.
81. Culombe made repeated requests for counsel but his requests were denied. See
id. at 609.
82. The investigators convinced Culombe's wife to pressure him to confess,
which, following a discussion with his wife, he did. See id. at 612-16.
83. See id. at 570.
84. Justice Frankfurter recognizes that interrogation or questioning is an integral
part of law enforcement activity, so much so that it may be justified "even in a society
which, like ours, stands strongly and constitutionally committed to the principle that
persons accused of crime cannot be made to convict themselves out of their own
mouths." Id. at 571. Justice Frankfurter also recognizes the potential for police abuse
and the risk that, despite legal prohibitions against improper techniques, intimidation
alone may accomplish the interrogator's goal. See id. at 574-75.
85. Id. at 576.
86. Id. at 577.
87. See id. at 577-78.
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nature and components of this problem, concerning as it does liberty and
security, had better be overtly and critically examined than smothered by
unanalyzed assumptions."88
Following this summary of practical concems,89 and a resulting conclusion
that the proper extent of police conduct in questioning demands careful
consideration,90 Justice Frankfurter engages in a discussion meant to
bolster his contention that the concerns over the constitutionality of
confessions warrant careful scrutiny.91 Justice Frankfurter, because of
the practical consequences of any decision on the issue, supports his
decision to address the constitutionality of the confession with an
independent argument. The independent argument is meant to emphasize
the importance of the issue, not resolve it.92
It is in this second portion of his opinion that Justice Frankfurter
employs foreign materials.93 Justice Frankfurter's goal at this stage is
not to resolve the issue, but rather to support his proposition that there is
ample concern to warrant a new examination of the constitutional
limitations on police interrogation.94 Discussion of binding precedent is
reserved for later in the opinion, and there is, at this stage, no attempt to
apply the particular facts of the case to the discussion. 95
Justice Frankfurter devotes nearly twenty-five pages to this second
portion of the opinion.96 In order to support consideration of the issue,
and to help illustrate the many dimensions of the issue, Justice
88. Id. at 578. Justice Frankfurter describes the two "poles" of the discussion.
The first pole is the understanding that "[q]uestioning suspects is indispensable in law
enforcement" Id. at 578 (quoting People v. Hall, 413 Ill. 615, 624 (1953)). The second
pole is comprised of the "cluster of convictions each expressive, in a different
manifestation, of the basic notion that the terrible engine of the criminal law is not to be
used to overreach individuals who stand helpless against it." Id. at 581.
89. See id. at 568-77.
90. See id. at 578.
91. See id. at 577-601.
92. In addressing Culombe's contentions, t4e Court (assuming any new departure
from, or expansion of doctrine) circumscribes to some degree the legislative autonomy
of state governments. By setting constitutional guidelines for the proper extent of police
questioning, the issue is removed from the democratic sphere. The decision to embark
upon an analysis of constitutional issues thus demands ample justification.
93. References to foreign materials are only made within one discrete portion of
the opinion. See id. at 577-601.
94. Justice Frankfurter has not yet discussed the facts of the case. See id. at 577606. Justice Frankfurter, at this stage of the opinion, is therefore not in a position to
resolve any issue because the issue has not been concretely defined.
95. Note that this portion of the opinion precedes the summary of facts. See id.
96. See id. at 577-601.
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Frankfurter engages in a wide-ranging discussion of the many similar
instances that have been settled by both state and foreign courts, and by
reference to academic literature. 97
Foreign experiences discussed by Justice Frankfurter include France's
practices regarding the requirements of counsel. 98 French experiences
highlight the fact that any decision affecting a suspect' s right to counsel
will impact the effectiveness and nature of interrogation.99 The
effectiveness of interrogation and crime prevention must be considered
concurrent with concerns for individual rights. 100 Any treatment of the
constitutionality of certain police practices must be conducted with an
awareness of this tradeoff. 101
French and English experiences are cited to help distinguish
inquisitorial from accusatorial systems. 102 Whether a system of justice is
inquisitorial or accusatorial impacts the role and scope of police
interrogation. In framing the limits of our own system, Justice
Frankfurter uses foreign experiences to help illustrate its accusatorial
nature. 103 An understanding of the accusatorial nature of our system is
important because it raises considerations of fairness and propriety in
interrogation which are distinct from those of an inquisitorial system. 104
A more than cursory discussion, with citations of significant case law,
is included in a footnote accompanying mention of the English
requirement that extrajudicial confessions be voluntary. 105 The English
97. See id. Justice Frankfurter finds broad similarity amongst the various courts
reviewed: "[T]his Court (in cases coming here from the lower federal courts), the courts
of England and of Canada, and the courts of all the States have agreed in holding
permissible the receipt of confessions secured by the questioning of suspects in custody
by crime-detection officials." Id. at 589-90.
98. See id. at 580 n.20. French law (at the time Frankfurter wrote the opinion)
required that an accused be allowed representation by counsel before the "juge
d'instruction." See id. Justice Frankfurter comments: "It is significant that critics of
French criminal procedure attribute the presence of third-degree methods and extrajudicial police interrogation in France to the impediment to judicial inquisition ...." Id.
99. See id. at 580 n.20.
100. See id.
101. Seeid.at587.
102. See id. at 582 n.24. The permissible bounds of interrogation and the
techniques employed depend on the requirement of the accusatorial system "that the
State which proposes to convict and punish an individual produce the evidence against
him by the independent labor of its officers, not by the simple, cruel expedient of forcing
it from his own lips." Id. at 582. Justice Frankfurter notes that continental countries
employing the inquisitorial method have long since abandoned reliance on torture. See
id. at 582 n.24.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 583-84.
105. See id. at 583-84 n.25. The original rationale for the English exclusionary rule
is the reliability of confessions. Justice Frankfurter asserts that the additional rationale of
preserving the fundamental tenet of the accusatorial system-that men not be compelled
to convict themselves-would be compromised by less than voluntary confessions. See id.
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requirement that extrajudicial confessions be voluntary 106 simply
supports the notion that the voluntariness of a confession may have
important implications. If voluntariness is important, then a review of
practices that affect the voluntariness of confessions may be warranted.
The widespread requirement in state law that a prisoner be taken
before a judicial officer with some promptness is supplemented by an
overview of related foreign practice, including the experiences of
Canada, Scotland, and the Philippines. 107 The practices of these foreign
nations illustrate the effect that prompt presentment before a judicial
officer may have on the determination of the fairness of any confession
that follows. 108 These fairness concerns underlie, in part, the Court's
decision to consider the issue. The conclusion that Justice Frankfurter
draws is that there is "unanimity for the proposition" that presentment
before a judicial body within a reasonable period of time is implicit in
the protection of personal liberty. 109
Not only is the discussion of the limitations of police power
supplemented by the inclusion of foreign materials, but the experiences
of those very same foreign governments also help inform the recognition
that limitations of police power cannot be absolute and that there is a
very real need for police interrogation. 110 In short, Justice Frankfurter
proposes that there is a need to limit police conduct, but that those
limitations cannot be absolute. He uses foreign materials to help
illustrate his point.
It is important to note that, at this point, Justice Frankfurter has not
attempted to address the facts of Culombe's case. 111 There is also a
notable absence of real discussion of applicable Supreme Court
decisions. 112 If the issues delineated at the outset are not addressed here,

106. See id.
107. See id. at 584 n.26. The proposed purpose of these laws is to "protect criminal
suspects from all of the dangers which are to be feared when the process of police
interrogation is entirely unleashed." Id. at 584.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 586 n.26.
110. See id. at 588-90. Justice Frankfurter cites the practice of English and
Canadian courts to allow the introduction of confessions secured during interrogation.
See id.
111. The portion of the opinion containing the foreign references, see id. at 577601, does not contemplate the specific facts of Culombe' s confession, nor does it explore
the constitutional implications of any of the relevant facts.
112. There are, however, some contrasts made between foreign and domestic
materials. See id. at 590-92.
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so much as related issues are reviewed, and if the facts relevant to the
determination of those issues are in no part factored into the discussion,
what then has Justice Frankfurter accomplished? The answer is that he
has justified the next step of his analysis (resolution of the issue), and he
has clarified the issue. The universal nature of the liberty concerns at
issue facilitates comparison to foreign experiences. 113 These foreign
experiences are not offered for the solutions or conclusions they
propose, but to support the contention that the concern for proper
treatment is a genuine one, and that this concern warrants consideration
in light of constitutional standards. Once this initial step is established
(with the help of comparative materials), then the analysis can
legitimately turn to the actual content of the U.S. Constitution and the
meaning of voluntary. 114
That this initial portion of the discussion is not material to Justice
Frankfurter's actual resolution of the issue becomes apparent when one
reads on. The references to foreign experiences and materials no longer
appear. Instead, Justice Frankfurter proceeds with a very traditionalstyle overview of related and binding precedent, a discussion of the facts
of the case, and an application of the cases discussed to those facts. 115
Justice Frankfurter concludes that the confession was indeed coerced
and this determination is made entirely upon application of U.S.
precedent. 116
Justice Frankfurter constructs an opinion that reflects the influence of
the common law method. His interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
issue does not revolve around any reading of the text; in fact, there is no
discussion whatsoever of the Constitution's text. 117 This opinion also
fails to invoke, in any serious manner, the intentions of the founders.
Justice Frankfurter's opinion rests entirely upon application of precedent
and the established doctrines. 118 The doctrines that have developed from
Fourteenth Amendment adjudication have enveloped the text of the
Amendment to the point that discussions of issues that arise do not
interact with the text, but with surrounding precedent. The text of the
113. Justice Frankfurter engages in a sort of analysis resembling Sujit Choudhry's
"Universalist" method. See discussion supra note 37.
114. See Culombe, 367 U.S. at 602.
115. See id. at 601-02.
116. See id. at 601-22 (Justice Frankfurter considers the many cases involving
determinations of voluntariness, and based upon the review of precedent, finds that
Culombe's confession was not coerced).
117. This is to say, no specific language is quoted. There is no discussion as to how
the actual wording of the Constitution might affect the determination of voluntariness.
See Culombe, 367 U.S. 568-605.
118. Justice Frankfurter's analysis is doctrine centered; there is no discussion of
framer's intentions. Id.

178

[VOL. 39: 157, 2002]

The Limited Role of Comparative Analysis
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Constitution may comprise the nucleus of this body of law, and
influence the nature of any exchange, but the tangible and important
reactions occur in the field of doctrines that surround the document.
This final portion of the opinion stands on its own, independent of the
preceding discussion and the discussion's inclusion of comparative
materials. Because Justice Frankfurter first justifies the Court's
consideration of the issue, the conclusions derived in the second portion
of the opinion are clearer, stronger, and may be applied with greater ease
in lower courts and subsequent exercises of the Supreme Court. Foreign
materials provide instrumental support to the conclusion that there is an
issue which warrants the attention of the Supreme Court. Overturning a
ruling of a state's highest court is no small matter, and the reasons
justifying a different outcome need to be well-defined, and their
importance well-supported. Comparative materials are not the sole
source of such support, but neither should their potential contribution be
presumptively ignored.
2. Knight v. Florida

In November of 1999, Justice Breyer dissented to the Court's denial of
certiorari in Knight v. Florida 119 and Moore v. Nebraska. 120 In both
cases, petitioners claimed that excessive delays in their execution
violated the Constitution's Eighth Amendment prohibitions on cruel and
unusual punishment. 121 Twenty-five years had passed since Knight was
sentenced to death, and nineteen since Moore's sentencing. 122 The
delays were due to constitutional defects in the states' death penalty
procedures. 123
119. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999). Justice Breyer's dissent is
instructive, not for any binding power, but because it illustrates a manner in which
comparative materials can inform constitutional interpretation while minimizing the risks
associated with borrowing or solutions not rooted in the domestic experience.
120. 528 U.S. 990 (1999) (reporting both Knight and Moore).
121. Id. at 993. Justice Breyer calls the delays "astonishingly long." Id.
122. Id. at 993-94.
123. Id. The petitioner in each case challenged state procedure by appellate and
collateral review. See id. at 993-95. Both petitioners were resentenced after
modification of state procedures. See id. Justice Thomas, in his brief concurrence to the
denial of certiorari, contends that there is no "support in the American constitutional
tradition or in this Court's precedent for the proposition that a defendant can avail
himself of the panoply of appellate and collateral procedures and then complain when his
execution is delayed." Id. at 990. Justice Thomas proposes that if there were support in
domestic jurisprudence, petitioners would have more to rely on than foreign authority.

179

Justice Breyer's dissent is instructive in that its central purpose is to
argue that there is an issue that should be addressed by the Court. 124
Justice Breyer does not attempt to resolve the issue. Instead, his dissent
focuses on illuminating the issue of potentially serious humanitarian
repercussions in cases where executions are delayed and the need to
examine the current state of the law. 125 In short, Justice Breyer is
engaged in the isolation and definition of the relevant issue. 126
Justice Breyer uses several different types of authority to support the
contention that there is a relevant issue, 127 but he does not apply the facts
to any binding precedent. 128 Foreign sources are the predominant authority
cited. 129 Foreign sources are used to illustrate the need to consider the
propriety of extremely delayed executions within the context of the U.S.
constitutional system. Foreign sources are not used to interpret the
Constitution, nor to draw any conclusion from the facts.
The summary of facts is followed by a brief discussion of the Court's
prior treatment of death penalty issues. 130 Justice Breyer cites decisions
that recognize the very serious suffering that accompanies the wait for
execution. 131 These decisions are not mentioned for the proposition that
they have any binding effect upon the court as applied to the facts of the
instant case. Instead, these cases support the proposition that there is, in
U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, recognition of the suffering inherent in
any wait for execution. This is the first step in his attempt to illuminate
the issue and to justify its further consideration.
Justice Breyer also cites a California Supreme Court decision
recognizing the "dehumanizing" effect of the wait for execution. 132 He
further considers academic treatment of the subject regarding evidence
See id. The subtle difference between the manner in which the foreign materials are
employed in Justice Breyer's dissent, and the manner in which Justice Thomas
contemplates their use, is that Justice Breyer uses them only to support the contention
that there may exist, within the bounds of the United States Constitution, a concern for,
and protection against, delayed executions, and that the constitutional implications are
worthy of the Court's consideration.
124. See id. at 994-99. Justice Breyer makes no conclusions, but he does assert
that, "[w]here a delay, measured in decades, reflects the State's own failure to comply
with the Constitution's demands, the claim that time has rendered the execution inhuman
is a particularly strong one." Id. at 993.
125. See id. at 994.
126. In this regard, Justice Breyer's dissent may be compared to the first portion of
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Culombe. See discussion supra notes 84-88 and
accompanying text.
127. See id. at 995-97.
128. Justice Breyer's discussion of domestic law, including state treatment, is
limited to one paragraph. See id. at 994-95.
129. See id. at995-98.
130. See id. at 994-95.
131. See id. (citing cases from both the U.S. Supreme Court and various state courts).
132. Id. at 994 (citing People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 (Cal. 1972)).
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of suicide rates among inmates on death row and the correlation of
suicide rates with the psychological toll inflicted upon those inmates. 133
Justice Breyer first contends that excessive delays compromise the
fundamental retributive and deterrent value of the punishment. 134 He
also contends that there is no historical justification for len~hy delays,
and for this proposition, he cites a recent English decision. 35 Despite
the English decision's foreign nature, he contends that the decision may
inform certain oriajnalist notions of what is acceptable treatment of
death penalty cases. 36 Thus, Justice Breyer begins by laying the domestic
groundwork for concerns over delayed execution. What follows only
clarifies and supports his contention.
Justice Breyer provides further support for the need to address the
constitutional implications of excessive delay in execution by surveying
the subject's treatment in foreign nations. 137 He believes that the facts
present an issue that should be addressed, 138 and he uses foreign
materials to bolster this assertion. He argues that a "growing number" of
foreign courts have found that excessive delay of execution amounts to
inhumane punishment. 139 The decisions of the courts of England, India,
Zimbabwe, and the European Court of Human Rights are all advanced in
support of this assertion. 140
Justice Breyer does not, however, view these examples as definitive. 141
The point of his dissent is not to argue a particular outcome, but to argue
that excessive delays in execution may implicate the existence of a
constitutional issue worth consideration. 142 He emphasizes the unsettled
See Knight, 528 U.S. at 995-96.
Id.
Id. Justice Breyer refers to Pratt v. Attorney Gen. for Jamaica, 4 LAW
REPORTS 769, 773 (P.C. 1993) (en bane) (holding Great Britain's "Murder Act" of 1751
required speedy execution).
136. See Knight, 528 U.S. at 995, stating: "Nor can one justify lengthy delays by
reference to constitutional tradition, for our Constitution was written at a time when
delay between sentencing and execution could be measured in days or weeks, not
decades." Id. Justice Breyer supports this statement by reference to Pratt. See id.
137. See id. at 995-96.
138. See id. at 993.
139. See id. at 995.
140. See id. at 995-96.
141. See id. Justice Breyer recognizes that the foreign authority is not binding and
makes reference to objections to foreign materials made by Justice Scalia in Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,868 n.4 (1988). See id.
142. See Knight, 528 U.S. at 996. The purpose of the dissent to certiorari, after all,
is to argue for consideration of an issue. Justice Breyer contends that because of the
similar circumstances involved, the decisions of the foreign courts may be "useful even
133.
134.
135.
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and complex nature of disputes over delayed execution by reference to
treatments by two additional foreign bodies that contrast with the stances
of the earlier mentioned courts. 143 The Canadian Supreme Court
extradited a prisoner facing the death penalty in the United States.
Justice Breyer makes the implicit inference that the Canadian court did
not see the risk of delay as conflicting with that country's constitutional
standards. 144 He also notes that the United Nations Human Rights
Committee has written that a delay of ten years does not necessarily
amount to a violation of the standards set forth in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. 145 The manner in which either body
would handle the lengthy delays in Knight is not clear. As Justice
Breyer notes: "Given the closeness of the Canadian Court's decision (4
to 3) and language that the United Nations Human Rights Committee
used to describe the 10-year delay ('disturbingly long'), one cannot be
certain what position those bodies would take in respect to delays of 19
and 24 years." 146 The nonconclusory nature of Justice Breyer's dissent
is supported by his use of the opposing foreign treatments. There is no
argument as to the superiority of one method over another, just a
discussion of the various decisions of other nations. 147 The review of
various foreign decisions supports the contention that excessive delays
in execution can be problematic and may conflict with the Constitution's
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.
There is no binding force to the foreign authority used and Justice
Breyer is very forthright in his admission of this fact. 148 He goes so far
as to quote Justice Scalia when he criticized the use of foreign experiences
in his Thompson dissent. 149 Nonetheless, Justice Breyer contends that
the "Court has long considered as relevant and informative the way in
which foreign courts have applied standards roughly comparable to our
own constitutional standards in roughly comparable circumstances." 150
Justice Breyer further contends that a "[w]illingness to consider foreign
judicial views in comparable cases is not surprising in a Nation that from
its birth has given a 'decent respect to the opinions of mankind."' 151
though not binding." Id. at 997-98.
143. See id. at 996. The point of this contrast is to show that there is no single
accepted notion of the extent to which delayed executions are cruel and unusual punishment.
The further inference may be made that the current state of domestic jurisprudence
amounts to an inaccurate or incomplete understanding of the Constitution's true protections.
144. See id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 997.
148. See id. at 996. "Obviously this foreign authority does not bind us." Id.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 997.
151. Id.
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How these views are to be considered, and in what manner they
impact our own constitutional adjudication, is of course the critical
concern. As discussed previously, direct borrowing of foreign solutions,
or application of foreign solutions to a course of reasoning on specific
facts may violate certain norms of interpretation, may involve certain
risks of misunderstanding, and are certainly subject to very volatile
criticism. 152 If Justice Breyer's dissent is construed as resembling the
initial stage of a doctrine-based interpretive method, where relevant
issues are isolated and supported, then the manner in which the foreign
materials are used does not conflict with the aforementioned criticisms.
Analysis of facts, and the resulting interpretation of the Constitution, are
separate from the dissent' s use of comparative materials.
Justice Breyer does not contend that the delay in execution always
amounts to cruel and inhumane punishment, but that it may, as applied to
the facts. 153 The discussion never gets this far. Justice Breyer, in a
manner consistent with a dissent to certiorari, only contends that there is
an issue, and that it is worthy of consideration by the Court. 154 Foreign
materials facilitate a stronger, clearer understanding of Justice Breyer's
position, but their use has no direct impact on the conclusion with
respect to constitutional interpretation.
3. Conclusion
Courts must clearly define the issues to be addressed, and they must
also support the decision to address a particular issue. This is especially
true where the issue to be addressed involves constitutional interpretation.
In the above examples the authors used foreign sources to support the
position that the issues involved warranted consideration. The use of
foreign examples is independent of any conclusions of law. Because
foreign materials do not contribute to the actual resolution of
constitutional issues raised by these cases, there is no risk that foreign
solutions will be borrowed or that interpretations derived will be from
other than a uniquely domestic origin.

152.
153.
154.

See discussion supra notes 25-38 and accompanying text
See Knight, 528 U.S. at 998.
See id. at 999.
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B. Comparative Analysis to Clarify Reasoning
In ruling on constitutional issues, the Court faces an obligation to
make its reasoning clear. 155 This obligation is complicated by the
complex nature of the subject matter. Both civil liberties and federalism
issues may be wrapped in layers of precedent and years of evolving
historical practice. It is critical to the Court's ability to effectively
resolve issues that it gains an understanding of the system in question.
An ability to convey this understanding to lower courts and practitioners
is equally important. By using comparative materials, the Court is able
to contrast the United States' constitutional system with the systems of
foreign courts. This exercise produces an awareness of differences that
helps the Court to better understand its own system. 156 Within the
context of a precedent-centered analysis, the Court, in the example
below, uses comparisons of domestic and foreign practices to sharpen an
understanding of its own unique system.

1. Raines v. Byrd
In Raines v. Byrd, 157 Chief Justice Rehnquist makes reference to
several European systems in order to emphasize the proper scope of the
judiciary' s Article III powers. 158 The opinion, however, is dominated by
discussion of precedent and historical practice, 159 and ultimately, the
Court's conclusion is derived entirely from a domestic basis.
In Raines, several members of the 104th Congress filed suit against
officials of the executive branch to challenge the constitutionality of the
Line Item Veto Act. 160 The district court granted the Congressmen's
motion for summary judgment, holding the act unconstitutional as a
violation of the Presentment Clause. 161
155. On the simplest level, this obligation stems from the need to give lower courts
effective guidance in the application of legal standards in future cases. On a more
complex level, the process of reason-giving supports not only the legitimacy of the
judiciary, but also the legitimacy of the entire governmental apparatus. See discussion
supra notes 25-56 and accompanying text.
I 56. This comparison of systems in order to better understand differences is
essentially what Mark Tushnet calls the expressivist use of comparative materials. See
Tushnet, supra note 7, at 1228-29; see also discussion supra note 37.
157. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
158. See id. at 828. This brief reference to foreign materials is not enough to keep
Justice Scalia from joining the opinion. Justice Scalia's failure to object to the use of
foreign materials may suggest that he does not feel that foreign materials, when used in
this manner, impact the analysis so as to result in an interpretation of less than purely
domestic roots.
159. Only one paragraph of the seventeen-page opinion discusses foreign
experiences. See id.
160. See id. at 814. The line item veto was codified at 2 U.S.C. § 691 (Supp. ill 1997).
161. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 816-17; see also U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 7, cl. 2.
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On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the federal courts lacked
jurisdiction over the suit because of a failure to meet the Constitution's
"case-or-controversy" requirements. 162 The Court's determination rests
on an analysis of relevant precedent. 163 The Court notes that satisfaction
of the standing requirement demands an allegation of a personal injury
that is particularized, concrete, and otherwise judicially cognizable. 164
Further, Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasizes the importance of a
rigorous standing requirement, particularly where the court is asked to
review the constitutionality of actions of one of the other branches. 165
The Court goes on to distinguish the instances in which it has
addressed legal standing for legislators. 166 The discussion of precedent
is ultimately reinforced by a review of historical practice. Chief Justice
Rehnquist distinguishes the case, noting that the congressmen lack
support from precedent, and that "historical practice appears to cut
against them as well." 167 Each instance is discussed and specifically
distinguished from the case at hand.
As part of his examination of historical precedent, Chief Justice
Rehnquist discusses the effects that an alternative reading of the standing
requirement might have had where similar disputes between branches
existed. 163 He points out that to grant standing in this case would mean
162. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 818. "No principle is more fundamental to the
judiciary's proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of
federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies." Id. (quoting Simon v. E. Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976)).
163. See id. at 818-26.
164. See id. at 819. "We have also stressed that the alleged injury must be legally
and judicially cognizable. This requires, among other things, that the plaintiff have
suffered 'an invasion of a legally protected interest which is . . . concrete and
particularized' ...." Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992)).
165. Id. at 819-20. Justice Rehnquist calls the standing requirement "especially
rigorous" when the Court is asked to address the constitutionality of an act of one of the
other branches. Id.
166. See id. at 820-26.
167. Id. at 826.
168. See id. at 827-28. Chief Justice Rehnquist notes the failure of Presidents
Wilson, Grant, or Cleveland to challenge the controversial Tenure of Civil Offices Act,
passed in 1867. The act provided that an official, whose appointment to an Executive
Branch office required confirmation by the Senate, could not be removed without the
consent of the Senate. See Tenure of Civil Offices Act, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867).
The Attorney General would have had standing to challenge the statute at issue in INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), because it "rendered his authority provisional rather than
final." Raines, 521 U.S. at 828. Similarly, President Ford could have challenged the
appointment provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act and a member of
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that one or another party could have maintained standing in earlier
disputes where there was in fact no litigation. 169
Chief Justice Rehnquist bases his conclusion on his reading of
precedent supported by historical practice. 170 At the heart of the
determination is the inability of the Congressmen to allege a personal
injury. 171 Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasizes the importance that the
U.S. constitutional scheme places on personal injury as a requirement for
standing by comparison to systems that have less stringent standing
requirements. 172 He notes that several European countries, including
France and West Germany, would grant standing in similar situations. 173
The juxtaposition of the more flexible European systems against that of
the United States helps him express the unique requirements of the
Constitution, and the necessary effect of the limited jurisdiction of
Article ill courts on the outcome of the litigation. 174
In this case, the role of comparative materials is a small one, as is the
amount of space devoted to their use. The references to foreign
practices are not decisive, nor can their impact be clearly ascertained.
Nonetheless, comparative materials are used, and they do facilitate an
understanding of the Court's reasoning. More important is the fact that
foreign experiences are used in a manner that could, within the same
interpretive framework, play a much greater role.
C. Comparative Analysis in Moral and Policy Balancing

The third manner in which courts employ comparative analysis is to
provide empirical evidence to inform the balancing of moral and policy
oriented concerns. 175 The courts in the examples below employ foreign
experiences within the balancing stage of the common law interpretive
framework to help determine the desirability of breaking with established
doctrine. 176
Congress could have challenged President Coolidge's pocket veto. Id.
169. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 828.
170. See id. at 828-29.
171. See id. at 829.
172. See id. at 828. "There would be nothing irrational about a system that granted
standing in these cases; some European constitutional courts operate under one or
another variant of such a regime." Id.
173. See id.
174. Chief Justice Rehnquist notes that the United States Constitution "contemplates a
more restricted role for Article III courts." Id.
175. Sujit Choudhry proposes a limited license to use foreign experiences in making
empirical determinations. See discussion supra note 37. Justice Breyer has argued that foreign
experience may "cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a common
legal problem." Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
176. Balancing of moral and policy concerns is a step in the common law type of
interpretive method. See Strauss, supra note 23, at 895. The common law method is

186

[VOL. 39: 157, 2002]

The Limited Role of Comparative Analysis
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

In both of the examples discussed below, the Court considers, and
ultimately decides against, making a distinct departure from established
doctrine. In doing so, the Court uses comparative analysis to inform the
balancing determination.

1. Washington v. Glucksberg
In Washington v. Glucksberg, 177 the United States Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of a Washington statute making it a
felony to cause or assist any person in committing suicide. 178 The statute
was challenged by a group of doctors and terminally ill patients. 179
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist crafted an opinion that
explicitly employed comparative materials. 180 At issue was whether the
statute infringed upon constitutional due process protections. 181
doctrine based, but will accommodate departure from doctrine where relevant moral or
policy concerns outweigh the desirability of adherence to established precedent. See id.
The practice of, and value in, adherence to precedent may arise from an underlying
notion that David A. Strauss, in Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, calls
traditionalism. See id. at 891-92. Traditionalism centers on the notion that a court must
hesitate to reject judgments made by "people who were acting reflectively and in good
faith." Id. at 891. The concept emphasizes not just the "accumulated wisdom'' of
succeeding generations but also the practical real world tests to which these decisions
have been subjected: "They also reflect a kind of rough empiricism." Id. at 892.
While this reverence for the past cautions against change and inhibits the ability of the
court to casually make dramatic departures from established practice, it does not
preclude the possibility of change altogether. See id. at 896--97. The changes
implemented by a court may be, and ordinarily are, subtle and of limited scope,
accomplished by extension or limitation of existing doctrine. This is not to say that
courts engaged in the common law method are incapable of dramatic and sweeping
changes, or that they are bound inextricably to the past. Id. at 902-03. A court that is
convinced that established doctrine is outmoded or morally repugnant is not hopelessly
bound to precedent, but must only give the ''benefit of the doubt" to the practices of past
courts. See id. at 895. The power of the common law court is not limited to strict
application of the law as they find it, but extends to the modification or replacement of a
rule when application of the rule would create "malignant" results. See Schauer, supra
note 63, at 456. A break with the past can be justified by overwhelming policy
considerations, see id. at 467, or concerns of "public" and "conventional" morality. See
HARRY H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING TIIB CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND
TIIB PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 82-88, 96--123 (1990). Benjamin N. Cardozo, in his
discussion of the common law, recognizes the role of moral judgments by another name,
repeatedly making reference to "sociology" and "the welfare of society." See BENJAMIN
N. CARDOZO, THENATUREOFTIIBJUDICIALPROCESS 94-97 (1921).
177. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
178. WASH. REV. CODE§ 9A.36.060(1) (2000).
179. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 707-08.
180. See id. at 732-34.
181. See id. at 708. The Ninth Circuit, sitting en bane, found a constitutionally
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Chief Justice Rehnquist makes extensive use of foreign materials and
experiences to inform his discussion, emphasizing the experiences of the
Netherlands and the controversy surrounding their policy of permitting
physician-assisted suicide. 182 Although the opinion is grounded on an
examination of U.S precedent and tradition, foreign sources are used to
facilitate the Court's determination that any deviation from existing
precedent is unwarranted.
After a careful examination of the domestic tradition and precedent, 183
and a refusal to extend established protections to the right to assisted
suicide, 184 Chief Justice Rehnquist discusses the further constitutional
requirement that Washington demonstrate a legitimate state interest. 185
The Court's conclusion that this interest exists is derived in part from its
examination of foreign sources.
The determination to break from established practice requires an
understanding of the possible moral and social concerns, the relative
weight of each factor, and how, on balance, they interact. 186 Comparative
materials can offer insight into this determination in the form of empirical
experiments, 187 and indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist puts them to this use.
The opinion employs a two-prong test to explore the constitutionality
of the Washington statute. The Court must consider the impact of
history and precedent on the constitutionality of the statute, and it must
determine that the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
The court begins with an examination of "our Nation's history, legal
traditions, and practices." 188 This examination of the debate's historical
background begins with early English treatment of suicide and proceeds
through suicide's treatment in the United States. 189 This portion of the
protected right to die, amounting to the ability to control the time, place, and manner of
one's own death. The Ninth Circuit made the further determination that the state's
interests were not strong enough to warrant imposition on the constitutionally protected
right. See id. at 709.
182. There are numerous mentions of foreign experience, the most significant of
which focuses on the Dutch experience. See id. at 734.
183. See id. at 710-28.
184. See id. at 728. Chief Justice Rehnquist writes:
The history of the law's treatment of assisted suicide in this country has been
and continues to be one of the rejection of nearly all efforts to permit it. That
being the case, our decisions lead us to conclude that the asserted "right" to
assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected
by the Due Process Clause.
Id. (emphasis added).
185. See id.
186. See Strauss, supra note 23, at 901-04.
187. See discussion supra note 37.
188. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710.
189. See id. at 710-13. It is clear that suicide was not condoned in England. Id. at
711 n.9. This fact is emphasized by the harsh forfeiture penalties faced (realistically) by
the surviving family of the deceased. Id. at 713. The review proceeds with a consideration of
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discussion culminates with an overview of the various state practices, 190
concluding that our laws, "have consistently condemned, and continue to
prohibit, assisting suicide." 191
The issue that the Court must address is, however, the possible
unconstitutionality of the statute, and more specifically its infringement
on Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. 192 Thus, Chief Justice
Rehnquist engages in a careful overview of the Court's established due
process adjudication. 193 Due process protection, as developed by the
Court, extends beyond guarantees of fair process and the absence of
physical restraint. 194 The Due Process Clause provides "heightened
protection against government interference with certain fundamental
rights and liberty interests." 195 Despite the scope of the protections
already granted, and the recognition that these are not strictly limited,
there is a policy of reluctance to further expand these protections
"because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered
area are scarce and open-ended." 196 Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasizes
the need for caution in any expansion of the doctrine. 197 What he has
essentially said is that, only after careful consideration of competing
concerns, and the subsequent determination that overwhelming factors
exist, can the Court break from or extend existing doctrine. 198
the American colonies and their fairly complete adoption of the English common law.
Id. at 713-15. While the American approach did soften over time, it by no means moved
away from its condemnation of the practice of suicide. See id.
190. See id. at 714-19.
191. Id. at 719.
192. See id. at 708. The asserted liberty interest is the right of mentally competent,
terminally ill adults to commit physician-assisted suicide. Id. The Court finds that the
statute is not unconstitutional because there is no such protected liberty interest and
because the statute promotes a legitimate state interest. Id. at 728.
193. See id. at 719-29.
194. See id. at 719.
195. Id. at 720.
196. Id. (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
197. See id.
By extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest,
we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and
legislative action. We must therefore "exercise the utmost care whenever we
are asked to break new ground in this field," lest the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the
Members of this Court.
Id. (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 125).
198. That the Court may consider either extending or departing from a doctrine is
significant; in Glucksberg, there are two possible means of extending Fourteenth
Amendment protections to physician-assisted suicide. The Court may break from
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Chief Justice Rehnquist's review of the Court's prior treatment of
related issues does not reveal any place in that tradition for the
acceptance of physician-assisted suicide. 199 His determination has its
sources in doctrine, not in any reading of the text. 200 Chief Justice
Rehnquist concludes that to hold the statute unconstitutional would be to
"reverse centuries of legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the
considered policy choice of almost every State."201
Regardless of the well-established tradition against assisted suicide,
the Court notes that the Constitution requires that the state statute be
"rationally related to legitimate government interests."202 In other
words, the constitutionality of the statute depends on the existence of an
acceptable governmental concern. The Court, in making the determination as
to whether this sort of interest exists, must necessarily weigh the moral
and policy concerns raised by assisted suicide.
The effective result of this two-prong test applied by the Court is that
the constitutionality is dependent on its basis in established doctrine; but
tradition and precedent alone will not sustain it. There must be a
demonstrated legitimate state interest in maintaining the statute and its
imposition on personal liberties. 203 If the court finds that governmental
concerns are not sufficient enough to outweigh the imposition on
personal liberties, then the statute is unconstitutional despite its grounding in
tradition. 204
Chief Justice Rehnquist crafts an opinion focusing on the analysis of
precedent, tradition, and the interaction of Washington's statute with
these elements. His final step is to engage in a process of balancing the
competing moral and social concerns. This balancing determination is a
technique used by courts considering a break from doctrine. 205 It is here
that Chief Justice Rehnquist engages in a critical examination of foreign
experience and puts that knowledge to use in guiding his own determination.
established doctrine condemning suicide, or it may extend a line of cases protecting an
individual's control over their own body. See id. at 724-29.
199. See id. at 722-23.
200. See id.
201. Id. at 723. Not only does the established doctrine support the constitutionality
of the statute, but the court is unwilling to extend two lines of reasoning protecting
individual liberty. See id. at 724-29. Neither the reasoning supporting a patient's right
to refuse life-sustaining treatment, see Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 279 (1990), nor the reasoning supporting the right to abortion, see Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992), is accepted as indicative of the existence
of some fundamental liberty interest that might extend constitutional protection to
assisted suicide.
202. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20
(1993); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,305 (1993)).
203. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728.
204. See id.
205. See discussion supra note 176.
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Among the various state interests allegedly protected by the statutepreserving life; preventing suicide; avoiding the involvement of third
parties and their use of arbitrary, unfair, or undue influence; protecting
family members and loved ones; and protecting the integrity of the
medical profession-is the interest in preventing any future trend
towards euthanasia.206 In assessing the risk of euthanasia, the Dutch
experience is seriously considered.207 Physician-assisted suicide is a
reality in the Netherlands.208 There is also considerable controversy
surrounding the Dutch practice, and multiple commentators have concluded
that there have been numerous instances of involuntary euthanasia of
competent adults.209 These claims are by no means undisputed, as there
are also those critics who claim that there have been no such developments.210
Nonetheless, the Court accepts the experiences in the Netherlands as
empirical proof that the risk of euthanasia (both voluntary and
involuntary) is real, and as such, there exists a legitimate governmental
concern.211 The Court determines that the risk of facilitating a trend
towards euthanasia presents a sufficient government interest to support
an infringement on the purported liberty interest, and thus supports the
constitutionality of the statute.212 What the Court has essentially done is
to determine that the moral and policy concerns proffered by
Washington weigh heavier on balance than any of the interests proposed
in opposition to the statute.213
The Court focuses on established doctrine, but acknowledges the
possibility that a sufficient showing of social concerns might be able to
overcome the presumption in favor of that doctrine. 214 Comparative
analysis does not play a major role in the overall determination of the
Court. Despite frequent use of language purporting to recognize foreign

206. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728 n.20.
207. See id. at 732-34.
208. See id. at 734.
209. See id. at 734-35.
210. See id. at 786 (Souter, J., concurring).
211. See id. at 735.
212. See id. ''We need not weigh exactingly the relative strengths of these various
interests. They are unquestionably important and legitimate, and Washington's ban on
assisted suicide is at least reasonably related to their promotion and protection." Id.
213. Had the court made the opposite conclusion, there would have been grounds
for finding the statute unconstitutional.
214. The balancing test is built into the test of constitutionality; there must be a
legitimate governmental interest to support the constitutionality of the statute. See
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728.
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experience, the bulk of the reasoning is based on purely domestic
sources. The end-balancing test, however, is capable of greatly affecting
the outcome of the decision. The balancing exercise stands apart from
the doctrine-based aspect of the process. As such, it is not bound by the
predisposition of exclusive dependency on domestic materials. That is,
the primary decision is positivist in nature, but this positivist conviction
can be overcome by considerations outside the established body of
law. 215 Comparative analysis should legitimately be included among
these sources if they are used to provide empirical insight to domestic
concerns. The same conclusion could very well have been reached
without the use of foreign sources. The use of foreign sources does,
however, ensure a more fully informed and complete analysis.
Foreign materials only inform the determination to part with existing
doctrine. The purpose of these materials, and the manner in which they
are used, is not to suggest adoption of the foreign approach. Objections
based on fear of borrowing, and its accompanying dangers, are
addressed by limiting the role of foreign materials to the first stepdetermining the need for change. Foreign materials may not be used as a
source of alternative constitutional interpretations if the objections are to
remain inapplicable. In this respect, the use of comparative materials to
inform the balancing decisions may be more readily open to abuse, and
subsequent criticism.

2. United States v. Walton
In United States v. Walton, 216 the Fourth Circuit, s1ttmg en bane,
provides another good example of comparative analysis informing a
question of social balance. Again, the issue is one of due process.
During a jury trial, the defendants, Eric A. Walton and Eldridge
Mayfield, were convicted "for conspiracy to influence a petit juror and
for aiding and abetting in the attempt to influence a petit juror."217 The
jury requested a definition of reasonable doubt, but the trial judge
declined to give the instruction.218 On appeal the defendants contended
that the court's refusal to define reasonable doubt indicated the
possibility that the defendants may have been convicted on less than the
appropriate showing and that there was a violation of their due process
215. In fact, the Court finds that the determination that valid government interests
exist is a part of the constitutional requirement. This sort of determination calls for an
empirical determination that may be made in large part on foreign materials. The
requirement of empirical determinations is one aspect of the interpretive process cited as
a justification for the use of comparative materials. See discussion supra note 175.
216. 207 F.3d 694 (4th Cir. 2000).
217. /d.at696.
218. Id.
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rights.219 The circuit court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Upon
petition for rehearing, the court agreed to review that decision en
banc.220 An equally divided court affirmed the trial court decision.
Judge Ervin wrote a per curiam opinion in support of the affirmance. 221
The Fourth Circuit's practice of not requiring a definition of
reasonable doubt, even when requested by the jury, was a longstanding
and well-established one.222 Judge Ervin supports the practice with a
discussion of the appropriate precedent of both the Fourth Circuit and
the Supreme Court.223 The relevant decisions of both the circuit court
and the Supreme Court establish that trial courts are not required to
define reasonable doubt.224 This discussion of federal law is supplemented
by a review of the practices in other circuits and states.225 The law in
four other circuits and fifteen states reflects the circuit court's rule that
no definition of reasonable doubt is required. 226 Judge Ervin ends this
portion of the discussion with a review of similar practices in the courts
of England and Australia.227 Reference to these courts is justified by
reference to their common lineage, and the "Anglo-American" heritage
of the reasonable doubt standard. 228
Judge Ervin eventually declines to make any departure from established
practice.229 He reasons that the arguments in favor of defining "reasonable
doubt" are overshadowed by the greater danger that attempts at
definition will only result in increased confusion on the part of the
jurors.230 The opinion neglects to discuss the reasons in favor of a definition
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See id. at 695.
222. Id.
223. See id. at 696-97. Judge Ervin quotes Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5
(1994):
[T]he Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt
nor requires them to do so as a matter of course. Indeed, so long as the court
instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant's guilt be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, the Constitution does not require that any particular form of
words be used in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof.
Id. at 696 (citations omitted).
224. See id.
225. See id. at 697 nn.3-4.
226. Seeid.
227. See id. at 698 & n.5.
228. Id. at 698 n.5.
229. See id. at 699.
230. See id. at 698. "[W]e remain convinced that attempting to explain the words
'beyond a reasonable doubt' is more dangerous than leaving a jury to wrestle with only
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requirement, though they are elaborated to some extent by the dissent. 231
Judge Ervin's opinion is a common law type analysis of a constitutional
issue, finding grounding and support for current practice in the court's
established precedent. He concludes that the dangers of departure from
doctrine outweigh any reason to alter established practice. 23
The sole purpose of the court's consideration of comparative sources
is a review of the continued viability of the established rule. 233 This
necessarily involves some weighing of the various implicated social and
policy concerns. Judge Ervin's failure to explicitly discuss the
arguments in favor of definition does not mean that he has failed to
engage in the balancing process. He recognizes the possibility of a
departure from doctrine by agreeing to review the case. A balancing test
is implicit in the process of review. He, however, finds no argument
persuasive in light of the concerns favoring the established practice. 234
Judge Ervin seems very certain in his assessment of the risks of
departure from doctrine. Further, he uses the lack of substantial
differences amongst similar foreign jurisdictions to bolster his implicit
claim that it has not left factors unconsidered that could tip the balance
in favor of departure. 235 Judge Ervin is justified in his virtual neglect of
competing concerns by using state and foreign experiences. The fact
that no such concern has arisen in those systems, lends support to the
notion that none exists in this one.
In light of well-established doctrine, and the conclusion that there are
not sufficient social concerns to necessitate departure from precedent,
Judge Ervin can rest comfortably in his conclusion. Again, foreign
experience is not a determinative factor, but an influential one. It is a
source of insight that lends a greater degree of comprehensiveness to the
opinion. Foreign materials do not provide conclusions, but do lend
credence to the notion that there is little reason to find an objection to
current practice. The conclusion that the Constitution does not require a
definition of reasonable doubt is based on domestic precedent and
tradition. 236 Judge Ervin's use of comparative analysis is significantly
less susceptible to objections to comparative analysis in constitutional
interpretation based on either the fear of borrowing or particularist notions.

the words themselves." Id.
231. Justice King, in dissent, emphasizes moral imperative in assuring against the
conviction of an innocent man. See id. at 701-02.
232. See id. at 698.
233. See id. at 696.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See id. at 696-97.
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3. Conclusion

Both Glucksberg and Walton provide examples of constitutional
interpretation within a common law framework. These two cases also
serve to demonstrate how the common law framework can accommodate
the use of comparative materials. Comparative materials can provide
empirical results that allow courts to make better-informed judgments in
assessing the continued viability of established doctrine. Both Glucksberg
and Walton employ comparative materials in this capacity. While the
use of comparative materials may have its own basis for positive
justification, it also results in an application of the knowledge in a
manner that deflects, to some extent, the objections to comparative
materials.
N. THE PRINIZ-GLUCKSBERG DILEMMA
One question remains to be answered: what, if anything, is to be made
of the seemingly polar opposite stances expressed by the Court in
Glucksberg237 and Printz,238 two decisions announced just one day apart.
In Printz, Justice Scalia's condemnation of comparative analysis is
made in response to Justice Breyer's suggestion, in dissent, that the
Court consider the alternative federal structures employed by certain
European countries.239 Facially, Justice Scalia's criticism of comparative
analysis in constitutional interpretation appears to be a broad condemnation
of the practice.240 This understanding of Justice Scalia's comments,
however, is contradicted by the Glucksberg opinion. Glucksberg specifically
employs comparative materials, and not just in a cursory manner.241
Justice Scalia joined the Court's opinion without comment.242

237. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), was decided on June 26,
1997. Chief Justice Rehnquist used foreign experiences to infonn his discussion of
euthanasia. See id. at 734--35.
238. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), was decided on June 27, 1997.
Justice Scalia called the use of foreign experiences "inappropriate" to the interpretation
of a constitution. See id. at 921 n.11.
239. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 921 n.11.
240. In response to Justice Breyer's proposed use of comparative analysis, Justice
Scalia writes: ''We think such comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of
interpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite relevant to the task of writing
one." Id. Justice Scalia emphasizes the unique nature of the United States' brand of
federalism. See id.
241. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 734--35.
242. See id. at 704.
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Justice Scalia's different reactions stem from the different manner in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist, in Glucksberg and Justice Breyer, in his
Printz dissent, employ comparative materials. In Glucksberg, the eventual
determination of the Court is rooted in an examination of domestic
tradition and application of domestic doctrine. 243 Foreign experience
interacts only peripherally with the doctrine-based analysis.244 Foreign
experience, in Glucksberg, simply helps inform a determination as to the
possible existence of a legitimate state concern. 245 The interest is of
domestic origin, and the constitutional solutions derived are rooted
firmly in domestic tradition.
In Printz, however, Justice Breyer proposes a more central role for
comparative analysis. Justice Breyer notes that other constitutional
democracies face similar issues of federalism. 246 These democracies
have not found, as the Printz majority does, that local implementation of
national policy is incompatible with the preservation of local control. 247
He suggests that a similar system of local execution of national policy is
not incompatible with the United States' own federalism. 248 He posits
that the success of such systems in foreign nations might cast an
"empirical light" on the practicability of applying a similar system in the
United States.249 Justice Breyer suggests that the common legal dilemma
(maintenance of local autonomy in federalist systems) suggests the
applicability of related solutions, specifically that the solutions of our
European neighbors might work within our own system.250
Though Justice Breyer's use of comparative analysis might be
construed as resembling the modes discussed in Culombe and Knight, 151
243. See id. at 719-29.
244. See id. at 733-36.
245. See id.
246. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 976. Justice Breyer writes:
[T]he United States is not the only nation that seeks to reconcile the practical
need for a central authority with the democratic virtues of more local control.
At least some other countries, facing the same basic problem, have found that
local control is better maintained through application of a principle that is the
direct opposite of the principle the majority derives from the silence of our
Constitution. The federal systems of Switzerland, Germany, and the European
Union, for example, all provide that constituent states, not federal
bureaucracies, will themselves implement many of the laws, rules, regulations,
or decrees enacted by the central "federal" body.
Id.
247. See id. at 976-77.
248. See id. "[T]heir experience may ... cast an empirical light on the consequences of
different solutions to a common legal problem-in this case the problem of reconciling
central authority with the need to preserve the liberty-enhancing autonomy of a smaller
constituent government entity." Id. at 977.
249. See id. at 976-77.
250. See id.
251. See discussion supra notes 77-154 and accompanying text.
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Justice Breyer's suggestions are more readily construed as proposals for
transplantation, in whole or in part, of solutions from one system of
federalism to another. Justice Breyer contends that the success of one
approach, in other systems, suggests the appropriateness of a similar
system in the United States.252
Justice Breyer's dissent cannot be construed as employing comparative
analysis to make empirical determinations of the type arrived at in
Glucksberg. In Glucksberg, the foreign experiences cast empirical light
on domestic concerns arising from domestic doctrine. 253 Justice Breyer,
in his Printz dissent, suggests that the empirical determinations made by
examination of foreign experiences suggest the possible successful
application of similar systems in United States federalism. 254 Justice
Breyer essentially suggests that a foreign solution might be borrowed or
transplanted into the domestic system.
Justice Scalia's reaction to the use of comparative materials differs
markedly because of the different manner in which they are employed.
Where, as in Glucksberg, comparative materials are employed in a
peripheral and limited manner, they are not objectionable. If, however,
as in Printz, the proposed use of comparative materials suggests a
solution that compromises the fundamentally domestic roots of a
constitutional interpretation, or implicates the risks of imperfect
translation, then that use of comparative analysis elicits strong opposition.
V. CONCLUSION
Any attempt to justify the use of comparative materials in constitutional
interpretation must address the concerns of critics.255 Unconstrained use
of comparative materials can lead to abuse and misuse. 256 The manner
in which courts have employed comparative materials within the
framework of the common law method constrains the influences of
foreign experiences so as to dissuade the various fears expressed by
critics of the technique.

252. Printz, 521 U.S. at 976-78.
253. See discussion supra notes 177-215 and accompanying text.
254. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 976-78.
255. See discussion supra notes 25-38 and accompanying text.
256. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 736-38 (1893) (Brewer, J.,
dissenting).
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Much of the resistance to comparative influences can be attributed to
American "exceptionalism" and legal "p:uticularism."257 These objections
are grounded in the belief that the United States Constitution is a unique
document and is uniquely representative of the American people. 258 The
resulting view is that interpretation of the Constitution should be
grounded in domestic sources and insight only.
The propriety of using comparative materials is suspect because of the
unique nature of the Constitution and its interaction with the American
people. 259 The courts in the above examples have used comparative
materials within a doctrine-centered interpretive framework that prevents
foreign influences from acting upon the relationship between the people
and the Constitution. Comparative materials, instead, are used to affect
our understanding of the relationship. The distinction between affecting
the relationship, and affecting the understanding of the relationship, is an
important one.
Comparative materials are used to facilitate an understanding of
existing constitutional relationships. The manner in which the Culombe
opinion and the Knight dissent employ comparative materials only
clarifies their understanding of issues already present. 26 Confusion over
the extent of Fourteenth Amendment protections addressed in Culombe
was present before the issue was viewed in light of foreign experience.261
Likewise, in Knight, the bounds of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishment were tested in light of domestic
experience, with a domestic standard. 262 Foreign experiences do not
suggest the issues; they only help courts to see them.
When disputes over constitutional issues arise, they come from a uniquely
American background. Courts use foreign materials to help identify and
justify the consideration of these issues, but the use of foreign materials
does not alter the nature of the issues.
Similarly, in Raines, the court uses comparative materials to clarify an
aspect of its reasoning. 263 The Court's treatment of foreign materials
emphasizes the differences of the systems, not the similarities. 264 In

°

257. See discussion supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
258. See id.
259. This is an exceptionalist argument. See discussion supra notes 27-31 and
accompanying text.
260. See discussion supra notes 77-156 and accompanying text.
261. Culombe was far from the Court's first attempt to address the proper extent of
police interrogations and the voluntariness of confessions. See Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U.S. 568, 603-06 (1961).
262. The roots of the discussion in Knight lie in domestic precedent. See Knight v.
Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 994-95 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
263. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 81 I, 828 (1997).
264. See id.
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emphasizing the differences, comparative materials also emphasize the
need to recognize the uniquely domestic nature of the problem.265 No
aspect of the Constitution, or the doctrines surrounding the Constitution,
is altered by the use of foreign experiences.
With regard to exceptionalist objections, the use of comparative
materials in moral and policy balancing could be the most difficult to
reconcile. This difficulty, however, is overcome by distinguishing between
concerns that are actually weighed in a determination of moral or policy
considerations and factors that inform the understanding of these
concerns. The courts in both Walton and Glucksberg weighed only
domestic concerns. In Glucksberg, the Court considered the domestic
fear that expansion of constitutional protection to assisted suicide could
lead to euthanasia.266 In Walton, the Fourth Circuit focused on the
inherently domestic concerns that juries would only be further confused
by attempts to define "beyond a reasonable doubt."267 The possibility
that physician-assisted suicide has lead to increased incidence of
euthanasia is not factored directly into the Glucksberg Court's balancing
exercise.268 An awareness of the Netherlands as an empirical experiment
may, however, affect the weight given domestic concerns over the
expansion of euthanasia.269 The critical point is that decisions to break
with established doctrine are made entirely on consideration of domestic
concerns. Comparative materials may inform the courts determination
as to the significance of the individual domestic concerns.
Comparative materials, when used within the common law framework,
and in the manner that courts have employed them, may be thought of as
a lens and nothing more. Comparative materials do not act on the
Constitution or the domestic experience. Comparative materials simply
help courts see and understand the details of our own system.
Because comparative materials do not alter the interaction between the
Constitution and the American people, our understanding of the Constitution
remains rooted in purely domestic sources. Furthermore, because our
interpretation of the Constitution remains rooted in purely domestic
sources, the Constitution remains a pure representation of this nation's
people. An exceptionalist objection to comparative materials is founded
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

See id.
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 734-35 (1997).
See United States v. Walton, 207 F.3d 694, 696-99 (4th Cir. 2000).
See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 734-35.
Seeid.
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on concern for the unique and pure nature of the Constitution. The
quality of uniqueness, however, is not necessarily compromised by the
use of comparative materials.
Comparative materials have also been employed in such a manner as
to address concerns over borrowing or transplantation of legal solutions.
Courts using comparative materials in the examples discussed above do
not look to foreign sources for the purpose of borrowing. Even if courts
did try to borrow foreign solutions, concerns rooted in traditionalism270
would significantly limit their ability to do so. While traditionalism may
give way to overbearing moral or policy concerns, it is difficult to
imagine concerns so great as to motivate a court to resort to a solution
not grounded in domestic experience.
None of the cases discussed in the preceding section involve any form
of borrowing. Where solutions are not borrowed from foreign sources,
concerns over transplantation are not relevant. Imperfect comprehension
of foreign legal systems or doctrine that might otherwise impact the
effectiveness of any borrowed solutions becomes less bothersome if
transplants do not occur.
Courts employ comparative materials in a number of ways. First,
comparative materials help define issues, and facilitate an understanding
of the importance of addressing those issues as they relate to the United
States' constitutional scheme. Second, comparative materials also highlight
relevant differences when contrasted with domestic practices. Lastly,
comparative materials provide empirical evidence to inform the court's
consideration of possible departures from established doctrine. The limited
use of comparative materials results in a contribution to constitutional
interpretation that does not warrant criticism.
LOUIS

270.
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See discussion supra note 176.
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